International Development Assistance and Food Security by Alan Matthews
International development assistance and food security
Trinity Economic Paper Series
Policy Paper No. 98/2







Not only has development assistance overall been falling in volume terms,
but the share of this ODA going to improving agriculture and nutrition in
developing countries has also fallen.   This paper investigates the reasons for the
declining commitment of donors to these areas and whether this can be reversed.
Favourable policy changes to encourage agricultural development in many
developing countries, as well as the steps taken to open agricultural markets in
the Uruguay Round, should help to improve the performance of agricultural aid
projects and encourage greater donor commitment.  Emphasis on a more
poverty-focused agricultural development strategy would also help to build
support among development NGOs in donor countries.  The outlook for
reversing the decline in food aid is less promising, although a series of food
emergencies which greatly increased the numbers of refugees and displaced
persons could alter this prognosis.
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0 Introduction
Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.  In recent decades
there has been a significant improvement in food security.  Current food
availabilities for the world as a whole were estimated at 2720 calories per
person per day in 1990-92, up from 2300 calories in 1961-65 or an increase of
18 per cent (FAO, 1996a).  Coupled with some small improvement in the way
these global food supplies are distributed, the proportion of undernourished
people in developing countries has fallen substantially from 35 per cent in 1969-
71 to 21 per cent in 1990-92.   This decline has taken place in all regions with
the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa.   Famines, which were once an almost
inevitable occurrence in low-income societies, have been virtually confined in
recent decades to conflict situations.
But progress has been uneven, leaving an unacceptably large number of
undernourished or food-insecure individuals.  FAO estimates that currently more
than 800 million people suffer from malnutrition, with millions more at risk from
sudden and unforeseen adverse shocks to food production, prices or supplies
(op.cit.). The role of international assistance in promoting food security has been
debated at two major international conferences in the past three decades, the
World Food Conference in 1974 and the World Food Summit in 1996.  Yet
despite the evident need for co-ordinated international action to tackle the causes
of hunger, in recent years there has been a steady falling-off in the international
commitment to this goal.   International aid to agriculture dropped dramatically
during the 1990s.  Food aid flows to developing countries peaked in 1993 and
have fallen significantly since then.  The 1996 World Food Summit attempted to
redress these trends and to refocus world attention on the problem of hunger, but2
the Declaration and Plan of Action adopted at the Summit contained little that
was new in firm commitments.1
Given the close relationship between poverty and food insecurity, a wide
range of international actions indirectly impinge on food security.  The overall
level and terms of financial flows, the generosity of debt rescheduling and relief,
market-opening trade policy measures and international economic co-ordination
all vitally affect the economic growth prospects of the most food-insecure
countries.  To comprehensively cover all of the international actions which
impact on food security is beyond the scope of this paper.  Instead, it examines
two areas where external support can prove useful to countries implementing
food security strategies:
• by providing funds for investment in increasing food production, including
agricultural research
• by providing food aid to meet emergencies and to raise the nutritional
standards of particularly vulnerable households
The paper investigates the reasons for the declining commitment of
donors to these areas and whether this can be reversed.
1 Finance for agriculture and rural development
 The bulk of the development finance to agriculture is provided by
countries belonging to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
OECD and by the international financing institutions (IFIs) such as the World
Bank and the Regional Banks.  Official development finance includes both
official development assistance (ODA) as well as flows on more commercial
terms.   Analysis of aid flows to agriculture and rural development ideally should
                                               
1  A balanced review of what the Summit achieved and failed to achieve is provided in3
be based on the net flow of resources to these sectors.  However, there is no
sectoral breakdown of the data on resource flow disbursements, nor is it feasible
to net the gross flows to any individual sector such as agriculture.  Under the
circumstances, the best that can be done is to examine the trends in the
commitments of external financial assistance to agriculture (Bhattacharjee,
1977).  Data on commitments tend to exaggerate the actual flow of resources, in
part because repayments of loans are not netted out, and in part because of the
time lag between the commitment of assistance and its disbursement.   We
should also note that data on external assistance to agriculture are classified
according to two definitions.  The narrow definition includes activities directly
contributing to the development of agricultural production such as crop and
livestock development, fisheries, forestry, irrigation and land development,
supply of fertilisers and other inputs, agricultural services and storage.  The
broad definition includes, in addition, agro-industries, rural infrastructure,
construction of plants for fertilisers and other inputs and projects for rural,
regional and river basin development.
 After the food crisis in the early 1970s annual commitments in current
terms on the broad definition rose to around US$12 billion.  This was
maintained through the first half of the 1980s and increased to US$15 billion
towards the end of the decade.  Thereafter commitments fell back to US$12
billion in 1992 and have continued to decline since, falling to around US$10
billion per year by 1995.   The fall during the 1990s appears even more marked
if adjusted for inflation.  In real terms, deflating by the UN unit value index for
exports of manufactured goods, annual flows averaged just over $17 billion (at
1990 prices) in the early 1980s and were only just below this figure in the years
at the end of the 1980s.  In the early 1990s they fell to $13 billion and to just
                                                                                                                                    
ODI (1997).4
$10 billion annually by the mid-1990s (Table 1).  The fall in the assistance to
production agriculture is even more stark as the sectoral statistics increasingly
include support for environmental protection and natural resource management
which, essential though they are, have less direct and immediate impact on food
production.  In regional terms, while Asia and Africa are the largest recipients in
absolute terms, it is disturbing to note a greater retrenchment in agricultural aid
commitments in Africa as compared to Asia during the 1990s given the very
limited domestic savings capacity in Africa at the present time (FAO, 1997a).
 The multilateral agencies have always been the most important source of
development finance to agriculture and their share has varied between 55 and 65
per cent of the total.  Lending to agriculture by the World Bank alone in most
years exceeds bilateral aid to agriculture from the DAC countries. World Bank
resources are not provided on concessional terms (except to the group of low-
income countries eligible for IDA financing), so it may be concluded from these
figures that most external finance for agriculture is loan finance which must be
repaid.  Both multilateral and bilateral donors reduced their assistance to
agriculture equally severely in the 1990s, although the share of the multilateral
agencies recovered slightly from its relatively low point at the end of the 1980s.
Total bilateral commitments from DAC countries have fluctuated around US$4
billion annually during the past five years. Just over half of total bilateral
commitments in 1995 came from Japan, which increased its share from one-third
of the total in 1991.  Germany was the second highest donor in 1995, followed
by the Netherlands, the United States and France.  The US share of bilateral
agricultural aid has steadily decreased from more than 30% in the early 1980s to
less than 10% in 1995 (Table 2).
 The proportion of a donor’s total aid budget allocated to the agricultural
sector is one measure of its commitment to this sector.  The aggregate figures5
mask very large variations among individual donors in the changing shares of
agricultural aid.  The big drop in the proportion of total bilateral aid going to
agriculture occurred in 1990.  In the second half of the 1980s, assistance to
agriculture averaged around 12 per cent of bilateral ODA;  throughout the 1990s
the figure has remained around 7.5 per cent.   The biggest change in commitment
to agriculture occurred in the US and among the ‘Other’ category of donors
although the proportion of EU bilateral aid to agriculture and, to a smaller
extent, Japanese aid also fell (Table 3).
 Trends in bilateral aid are mirrored in the lending behaviour of the
multilateral development banks.  The most important lender, the World Bank,
had a  strictly agricultural portfolio with a commitment value of about US$25
million in 1996 (17 per cent of the total Bank portfolio).  Adding in the non-
agricultural rural portfolio of projects classified in other sectors but with rural
components, the total rural portfolio had a commitment value of US$35 billion
(24 per cent of the Bank total) (World Bank, 1996).  However, World Bank new
lending to agriculture, as a share of total lending, has fallen from 30 per cent in
the mid-1980s to 12 percent in 1996 (Table 4).  A recent analysis of EU aid (i.e.
that portion of European Union aid which is managed by the European
Commission) also demonstrated the sharp falling off in the commitment to
agriculture by the EU, and particularly for more broadly-based rural
development projects (Table 5).
 
2 Investment needs and development assistance flows
 The relative scale of external assistance to agriculture can be illustrated
using FAO data.  FAO has estimated that net investments in on-farm
improvements in developing countries may have been US$26 billion per year in
the recent past (US$77 billion gross) and in the post-production sector US$156
billion per year (US$34 billion gross).  In addition to these largely private
investments, public expenditure on research and extension in LDCs may be
estimated at about US$10 billion per year and on rural infrastructure at, very
tentatively, US$20 billion annually.   Even with external assistance at the low
levels in the mid-1990s of around US$10 billion annually, it is clear that it has
funded a significant share of public investment in the rural sectors of developing
countries.  For many of the poorer developing countries, external assistance is
almost the only source of public investment in agriculture and to a large extent
also of recurrent costs (FAO, 1996b).
 As to future investment, FAO estimates that to increase food production
in developing countries in line with effective demand until 2010, gross
investment of some US$86 billion will be required annually in primary
agricultural production (including irrigation), US$43 billion for related post-
production facilities and US$37 billion for public support services and
infrastructure.  Nearly three-quarters of this future investment will consist of
private commitments by farmers for land improvements, new equipment,
expansion of livestock herds and plantations, and for private investments in the
post-production chain.  The remaining one-quarter, representing about US$41
billion per year, will consist of complementary public investments to create and
maintain the conditions for profitable private sector investment.  If external
multilateral and bilateral financial support for these public investments were to
provide the same share as in the past, i.e. around one-third overall, external
commitments would need to rise by some US$5 billion per year, from US$10 to
US$15 billion annually, i.e. to the level provided in the late 1980s.
 International net private capital flows into developing countries are now
much more important than official development finance, having risen from
US$49 billion in 1990 to US$234 billion in 1996, compared to total official7
development finance of about US$66 billion net in the latter year (OECD 1998).
However, little of this private investment went into primary agricultural
production.  Private finance has a role in funding programmes for plantation
crops, large irrigation projects and other activities to do with input supply,
processing and marketing which it can usually run more efficiently and more
flexibly than government-run institutions.  The World Bank has even supported
the use of private sector institutions to carry out research and deliver information
in ways that are more responsive to farmers’ demands (World Bank, 1996).
However, the record is that private investment is highly selective, going mainly
to China and a handful of other growth centres in Asia and Latin America, and
often requires complementary public sector investments to create the right
opportunities.  It would be naive to assume that agriculture’s financing needs can
be met from private sources alone, particularly in low-income food-deficit
countries (LIFDCs). 2
 
3 Reasons for agricultural aid fatigue
 Will donors be willing to meet the challenge of finding additional
resources for agricultural development?  To answer this question, it is necessary
to understand why aid to agriculture has been falling in recent years.  Previous
work on trends in aid to agriculture undertaken at the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) distinguished two major categories of causes:
economic and political economy.  Economic reasons centre around the
hypothesis that agricultural development assistance did not pay off and,
therefore, donors turned elsewhere.  Political economy reasons revolve around
two hypotheses:  that the power of political interest groups led to reduced
                                               
 2  LIFDSs include all food-deficit countries with per caput incomes below the level8
emphasis on agriculture, and that certain bureaucratic distortions in aid agencies
undermined a commitment to agriculture (von Braun et al., 1994).  The
continuing relevance of these arguments are briefly reviewed in this section.
 The poor performance of many agricultural projects has not helped the
case for additional resources.  At the World Bank, a dismal 58 per cent of
completed agricultural projects were judged satisfactory or better in the period
1981-89, ten percentage points worse than the Bank average (World Bank,
1996).  There are various reasons why aided agricultural projects performed so
poorly.  In some cases, the original projects may have been poorly designed
from a purely technical perspective.   Second, even well-designed projects which
would yield acceptable rates of return in a favourable macro-policy context can
perform poorly if the general macroeconomic environment turns hostile.  For
example, commodity prices play an important role in the outcome of a project,
and declining prices result in decreased returns.  Third, in many countries
unfavourable price trends may have been exacerbated by domestic policies
seeking to promote non-agricultural sources of growth.  The growing awareness
of the key role of the macroeconomic environment in determining success or
failure of agricultural projects led many donors to turn away from direct project
lending towards support for structural adjustment and policy-based lending.
Opportunities to invest in agricultural projects were ignored on the view that,
until appropriate sectoral policies were adopted, specific project investments
would fail (Von Braun et al, 1994).
 While the poor return on agricultural projects helped to ‘push’ funding
away from agriculture, the increased pressures for programme lending to support
economic reforms and debt relief, as well as the desire to divert finance to the
high-profile environmental protection and social sectors helped to ‘pull’ funding
                                                                                                                                    
used by the World Bank to determine eligibility for IDA assistance (i.e. US$1305 in 1992).9
away from the sector.   The rise in the share of social spending and the growth of
programme lending in the late 1980s emerges clearly in Table 6.  Social and
environmental spending are undoubtedly important, but should be seen as
complementary to aid to production agriculture rather than a substitute for it.
For example, there is an important link between environmental protection and
increases in agricultural production.  Farmers who increase yields per unit of
land have less reason to push into marginal, environmentally sensitive lands to
meet food needs.  And local resourcing for initiatives in the social sector, such
as schools, health services etc. cannot be sustained without an improvement in
the productive base of the economy.
 From a political economy perspective, the allocation of development
assistance is a product of competition among pressure groups in both donor and
recipient states.  Von Braun et al. (1994) argue there were several political
market forces at work in the 1980s which acted to reduce the supply of
development assistance to agriculture.
 As the over-production of farm commodities in developed countries
increased and prices fell, domestic farm lobbies increasingly opposed assistance
which was perceived as increasing the supply capacity of potential markets.
This was especially the case in the United States where the combination of
increased production and an appreciating exchange rate put severe pressure on
farm incomes in the 1980s. As the same time as farmer support for aid to
agriculture was waning, other groups tried to influence the composition of aid in
their favour.  Financial institutions and banks were concerned at the ability of
developing countries to service and repay loans and lobbied for adjustment
lending to support macro and micro policy reforms.   Nor did policy-makers in
developing countries push for a higher priority for agriculture.  Agriculture was
often viewed as a declining sector, and therefore not important for development.10
Falling real food prices over two decades perhaps led to complacency. Urban
interests still dominate in political systems where the rural poor have little voice.
 In situations like this, the IFIs might have taken a more independent line
in pushing the results of research findings which emphasise the critical role of
developing agriculture for overall economic growth and the reduction in poverty,
especially in low-income developing countries.  However, von Braun et al. note
two bureaucratic changes which undermined the willingness and ability of the
IFIs to take a leadership role.  First, in a number of donor agencies, including the
World Bank, there was a shift away from functional units to regional
departments.  This meant there was no longer a single budget for agricultural
projects for which different countries could compete;  instead, agricultural
projects in individual countries had to compete with other sector projects in
those same countries.   With agricultural projects performing poorly relative to
other sectors, a declining agricultural share is not surprising.  Second, the
numbers of technically competent staff in agriculture was reduced, making it
even more difficult to design successful projects to claw back some of the share
which was lost.
 
4 The contribution of food aid to food security
 Assisting food production is the first way in which international assistance
can contribute to food security.  Helping to overcome chronic malnutrition
arising from lack of access to food is a second way.   Traditionally, this has been
a major rationale for food aid, and the commitment to raise cereal food aid to a
minimum 10 million tonnes a year was one of the main achievements of the 1974
World Food Conference.   Actual deliveries (including non-cereals food aid of
between 1 and 2 million tonnes) peaked at almost 17 million tonnes in 1993,
subsequently falling to 7.5 million tonnes in 1996 with forecasts for a similar11
volume in 1997.  In the mid 1980s, gross cereal imports by developing countries
amounted to around 100m tonnes, of which around 12 million tonnes were
supplied by food aid deliveries.  By 1996, gross cereal imports had risen to
around 150m tonnes, but only 7.5 million were supplied by food aid.   The
significance of food aid is even more important for the LIFDCs, although a
decline in its relative contribution to gross cereal imports has also occurred for
these countries (Table 7).
 Food aid as a proportion of overall ODA has gradually fallen from a high
point of over 10 per cent in the mid-1980s to less than 5 per cent at the present.
The US has traditionally been the largest single donor although its share of total
food aid has been slipping.  In 1996, 44 per cent of global deliveries were
financed by the USA, 35 per cent by the European Union and its Commission, 6
per cent by Japan and  15 per cent by other donors.  Food aid has generally
accounted for around 15 per cent of total US ODA and this proportion has not
altered much over time.  The other important donor is the EU through its
‘Community action’, i.e. food aid disbursed through the EU budget.  Food aid
has traditionally represented a large proportion of EU aid, amounting to 26 per
cent of the total in 1986.  This proportion declined  to 9-11 per cent of all EU
aid between 1993-95 (Cox and Koning, 1997).
 Associated with the decline in the overall volume of food aid there has
been a shift in its use and distribution.  Three categories of food aid can be
distinguished:  programme, relief and project aid.  Programme aid is not targeted
on specific groups.  Rather it is provided on a bilateral basis to support recipient
governments’ budgets or reduce balance of payments deficits.  Relief food aid is
aimed at people suffering from natural or manmade disasters, such as drought or
civil strife.  Project food aid is provided to selected groups to support specific
development objectives.   The nutritional impact of the three categories of food12
aid varies.  Relief and project aid most directly contributes to food security by
providing additional food assistance.  The major benefit of programme food aid
is that it may substitute for commercial imports and thus release foreign
exchange for general development purposes.   Another significant difference
between the categories is that a high proportion of programme aid is provided on
concessional loan terms, whereas virtually all relief and project aid is provided
in grant form.
 About 50 per cent of global food aid deliveries in 1993-94 was provided
as programme aid, 30 per cent  as relief assistance, and 20 per cent as support
for development projects.  Since 1990/91, the use of food aid for emergencies
has grown.  In the 1980s, the annual amount of food aid for emergencies
averaged 2.4 million tonnes, whereas over the last three years (1992-95) it
averaged 4 million tonnes.   This increase has been at the expense of both
project and programme food aid.
 During the 1960s, India was the main recipient of global food aid.  Asia
as a whole received nearly two thirds of all food aid in the form of cereals until
the mid 1970s and remained the largest recipient region until 1980.  At that point
Sub-Saharan Africa became the main recipient region and its share of total food
aid has remained fairly steady at around one-third of the total over the past
decade.   The main change in the geographical distribution of food aid in recent
years has been the major reallocation of food aid to Europe and ex-USSR
countries.   At their peak these countries absorbed over one-third of total food
aid, most of which was earmarked for balance of payments support.  Their
increased share was not at the expense of Sub-Saharan Africa but of Asia and, in
particular, North Africa and the Middle East.  Similarly, the main gainers from
the reduced flows to Europe and the CIS region in 1995-96 have been the Asian
countries.13
  Because food aid is doubly tied, it is often seen as a less desirable form
of aid.  Falling food aid flows, from this perspective, may simply reflect a
desirable adjustment in donors’ portfolios.  It is thus worth asking whether
falling food aid is a threat to food security and whether additional food aid flows
could make a positive contribution to reducing hunger.
 Projections of food aid needs are made regularly by agencies such as the
US Department of Agriculture and the World Food Programme.   Studies of this
kind forecast that food aid needs will nearly double by the middle of the next
decade, even with optimistic assumptions about recipient countries’ ability to
produce their own food or to have the financial capacity to import food
commercially.  For example, a 1995 USDA study projected total food aid needs
to maintain consumption and meet emergency needs for refugees at 15 million
tonnes in 1996, rising to 27 million tonnes by 2005.  More food aid would be
required if recipient countries’ financial capacity to import food commercially
lagged or if the consumption target was to meet minimum nutritional standards
(Shapouri, 1995).   The increasing incidence of humanitarian crises and political
turmoil in recent years is one factor behind the growing demand for food aid.
Nonetheless, in the USDA study only 20 per cent of the needs are classified as
emergency needs resulting from production variability and political conflict.
About 80 per cent of the food aid needs are classified as chronic (prolonged).
Given the forecasts for the continued growth in the absolute numbers of people
malnourished by 2020, the role for food aid targeted on food insecurity is set to
increase.
 The debate continues, of course, as to whether these needs would not be
better met by increased financial aid rather than food aid.  The main defence of
food aid is that it is not a substitute for financial aid but additional to it.  The
rationale for this argument is traced back to the origins of food aid in surplus14
disposal which effectively lowered the real or opportunity cost to donors of
providing food aid.   This is buttressed by the further argument that food aid is
supported by a coalition of political forces which are attracted to food aid
because of its specific characteristics (in providing an outlet for surplus
agricultural commodities, or because it facilitates market development) and who
would be unlikely to give support for financial aid of equivalent value.
Additionality may also arise where food aid is the responsibility of ministries of
agriculture and allocated separately from the mechanisms for deciding on
financial aid.
 A second defence of food aid as a preferred instrument to financial aid is
that it is more likely to succeed in reaching the very poor and food-insecure.
Food aid is seen as having a comparative advantage in reaching large numbers of
the world’s most vulnerable people.  Particularly project food aid, used as a
wage resource that transfers income to poor households through labour-intensive
public works programmes, or as an incentive to children and mothers to attend
school or health clinics, is of direct benefit to very food-insecure people in food
deficit countries.
 
5 Explanations for the decline in food aid
 Given these arguments in favour of food aid, the puzzle is to understand
why food aid commitments have fallen sharply in recent years.  Precisely
because of its additional nature, the factors influencing the supply of food aid are
not necessarily the same as those which explain the decline in external
assistance to agriculture.  Explanations can draw on two lines of enquiry into the
factors which have influenced the supply of food aid.  One is a statistical
approach which tries to identify the major determinants of donors’ propensity to
grant food aid;  the other is a political economy approach which focuses on the15
reasons why a country might prefer to provide food aid rather than financial aid
or no aid at all.
 Statistical analysis highlights the influence of the level of public stocks of
agricultural commodities, the price of food aid commodities as well as evidence
of need (Saran and Konandreas, 1991).  Many donors accumulate public stocks
as a result of domestic farm price support policies.  These stocks are costly to
store and in some cases may physically deteriorate in storage.  There is often
only a small likelihood that the stocks can be resold on the market at anything
close to their purchase price.  Giving these stocks away saves the resource costs
of storage and avoids their price-depressing effect on world markets.   The price
of food aid commodities has also been shown to be an important factor affecting
the level of food aid shipments.  In the short-run food aid flows vary inversely
with commodity prices.  In many countries food aid budgets are fixed in nominal
rather than volume terms; as commodity prices rise, less food can be bought.
The analysis also reveals that donors in general have responded positively to the
increased needs in recipient countries arising from short-term production
shortfalls, although the response is only a partial one and covers only a small
fraction of the cereal production shortfalls experienced.
 More generally, the multiplicity of objectives of donors' food aid
programmes is well documented.  Programmes combine diplomatic, commercial,
humanitarian, surplus disposal and development objectives to varying degrees.
Support for food aid will respond to the shifting balance between different
domestic constituencies whose interests it affects.  In the US, for example, the
general farm organisations have been strong supporters of food aid programmes
in the past.  As the US has adopted more market-oriented farm policies and the
likelihood of surpluses reduces, the farm interest group constituency for food aid
has diminished.  Increasingly, export enhancement programmes outside of food16
aid are preferred as a more effective way of disposing of surpluses (Ruttan,
1993)
 The link between food aid and surplus disposal has also weakened for
other reasons. Food aid is increasingly competitive with financial aid.  In the US,
for example, the Gramm-Hollings-Rudman Amendment shifted the attributable
cost of PL480 to the foreign assistance budget (Clay and Stokke, 1991).  In the
EU food aid is very deliberately not seen as linked to surplus disposal.  In 1988,
for example, despite the very limited availabilities and high prices in EU and
world markets, the EU maintained the quantity of dairy products in its food aid
programme at the level of previous years.  For the individual EU member states,
bilateral food aid programmes (known as ‘national actions’ as distinct from
‘Community actions’) are funded from national aid budgets and are not directly
linked to the surpluses generated by the EU’s Common Agriculutral Policy in
any case (Saran and Konandreas, 1991).  The gradual diversification of sources
of food aid since the late 1960s to include most industrialised countries has also
made the link between food aid and surplus disposal more tenuous.
 Paradoxically, de-linking food aid from surplus disposal has not increased
its popularity with the other important constituency of voluntary development
organisations.  Non-emergency food aid is frequently criticised by the
development NGOs, in spite of their growing involvement in the delivery of food
aid for nutritional objectives.  Many of the criticisms of food aid are based on
arguments well rehearsed in the academic literature, such as the alleged
disincentive effects of food aid in recipient countries, the possibility that it can
undermine local food markets and encourage the growth of inappropriate food
tastes.  As a consequence of such criticisms, official food aid programmes are
now more firmly embedded in a food security framework (see, for example,
European Council, 1996).17
 Saran and Konandreas (1991) argue that the opportunity cost of food aid
is an important factor behind food aid decisions.  Food aid donations tend to
raise the commercial price of food aid commodities above what they would be in
the absence of food aid and the revenue gain on commercial sales (for exporters)
helps to offset the revenue loss from providing some food as aid.    The size of
this world price effect depends on the relative elasticities of demand in the
commercial and food aid markets, as well as on the degree of leakage of food
aid commodities from the food aid to the commercial market.  For exporting
countries over the period 1971 and 1988 the opportunity cost of food aid in
wheat was barely one fourth of its average international price (Saran and
Konandreas 1991).  This cost is further reduced if account is taken of the fact
that much food aid has been provided on concessional or easy credit terms and
donors recover part of the cost over time.
 For various reasons, however, the opportunity costs of food aid have been
increasing and may now be close to the world price of the donated food
commodities.  For importing food aid donors, the opportunity cost necessarily
lies above the world price.   Even for exporters, however, the offsetting factors
are less important than before.  Food aid is now a much smaller part of world
trade in the main food aid commodities, so its leverage effect on world prices is
also that much smaller.  Donors increasingly bear the non-food costs of food aid,
such as the costs of procurement, transport and delivery to the final destination,
and these have been increasing.  Moves to source a higher proportion of food aid
deliveries in developing countries through triangular transactions, as favoured by
the EU, also raise the opportunity cost.  Thus the putative cost advantages of
food aid, and which helped to make the case for additionality in the past, are
now much less persuasive and attractive to those running foreign aid
programmes.18
 
6 Implications of Uruguay Round Agreement
 The implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture will
impact on future food aid flows.  Some commentators have argued that the
Agreement could encourage a more favourable attitude to food aid donations,
particularly if it fails to prevent the continued generation of food surpluses and
high subsidy costs in developed countries.  Because subsidisation of exports is
disciplined under the Agreement, bona fide food aid may be the only outlet for
exporting countries (Singer and Shaw 1996).  These authors argue that increased
food aid flows could assist the liberalisation objectives of the Agreement by
removing a substantial overhang of food from commercial markets which would
facilitate the adjustments required by developed countries while giving time for
commercial markets to grow in developing countries. However, as the
emergence of surplus food stocks would be a sign of inadequate adjustment to
the disciplines of the Agreement, it is not clear why the food aid option would
not simply become a crutch to postpone the necessary reforms rather than
facilitating them.
 The more likely outcome is that the reform process will reduce the
availability of food surpluses in the future.  As these have been positively
associated with food aid levels in the past, the Agreement will probably lead to
reduced food aid volumes.  The higher world market prices resulting from the
Agreement will also reduce volumes, given fixed food aid budgets.  This
interpretation is supported by the large downward adjustment from 7.52 to 5.35
million tonnes of cereals which the donor countries made in 1995 to their
minimum food aid commitments under the Food Aid Convention and by the
decline in actual food aid deliveries documented above.19
 The Agreement included a Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible
Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-
Importing Developing Countries. The Decision establishes mechanisms which
provide for: (i) review of the level of food aid and the initiation of negotiations in
the appropriate forum to establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to
meet the legitimate needs of developing countries during the reform programme;
(ii) the adoption of guidelines to ensure that an increasing proportion of food aid
is provided to the least developed and nonfood importing developing countries in
fully grant or highly concessional forms;  (iii)  financial and technical assistance
under aid programmes to improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure;
and (iv) differential treatment in the context of an agreement to be negotiated on
agricultural export credits.  The Decision also takes into account the question of
access to the resources of international financial institutions under existing
facilities, or such facilities as may be established, in order to address short-term
difficulties in financing normal levels of commercial imports.  The follow-up to
these commitments is monitored by the WTO Committee on Agriculture but to
date they have not led to substantive action.
 
7 Conclusions
Official development assistance to developing countries declined in
volume terms throughout the 1990s.  The focus of this paper has been on the
declining share within this total of external assistance to agricultural
development and food aid.  The paper has proposed some explanations for these
trends, and it has highlighted their detrimental impact on one of the most basic
human rights, to food security.  When the world community met in Rome at the
World Food Summit in November 1996, it adopted the Rome Declaration on
World Food Security which pledged its commitment to achieve food security for20
all and to an ongoing effort to reducing the number of undernourished people to
half their present level no later than 2015.  It further committed the donor
community to make efforts to mobilise technical and financial resources from all
sources, including external debt relief for developing countries, to reinforce
national actions to implement sustainable food security policies.  As we
approach the new millenium, what are the prospects that these words will be
translated into a reversal of aid commitments to agricultural development and the
improvement of nutrition?
The review of the reasons for the decline in external assistance to
agriculture highlighted a number of issues:  the poor performance on average of
some types of agricultural projects;  the complexity and cost of lending to
agriculture;  the futility of project aid in a hostile policy environment to
agricultural development;  the influence of farming and environmental lobbies in
developed countries;  crowding out by lending for structural adjustment and debt
relief, as well as for social and environmental objectives;  the reduction in
specialised agricultural staff in external assistance agencies;  and falling
international agricultural commodity prices.
The paper has highlighted the predominant role of the international
financial institutions in providing official development finance for agricultural
development.  Thus it is important that the World Bank Rural Development
Action Plan produced in October 1996 recognised that attention to rural
development had declined in the World Bank Group.  It proposed a series of
measures to redress this situation and put forward a series of revised principles
intended to guide World Bank lending in this area in the future.   The Bank has
also tackled the problem of poorly-performing agricultural projects.  The
proportion of satisfactory or better projects in the agricultural portfolio had
increased to 78 per cent in 1995, 10 percentage points above the Bank average21
for all projects in that year.  The Action Plan sets a target of satisfactory ratings
for at least 80 per cent of completed projects by the year 2000 and beyond,
recognising that improved project performance is essential to increased
commitment both inside and outside the World Bank Group.
The Plan recognises that the 80 per cent satisfactory rating target by the
year 2000 is its only quantitative target.  Crucially, no targets are set for overall
lending to agriculture.  Indeed, it is recognised that increased lending volume in
recipient countries which agree to buy into higher priority for agriculture and
rural development will be offset by a complete or nearly complete withdrawal
from countries where efforts to build a consensus on giving higher priority to
agriculture fail. Nonetheless, the Plan clearly hopes that a renewed commitment
by the Bank to agricultural lending will send a signal both to other donors and to
developing countries which will lead to an overall increase in the volume of
flows.
There is evidence that other donors are beginning to follow suit.  For
example, the EU states that it ‘has made food security a priority in development
policy’ and that ‘the range of development policy instruments, whether in the
framework of the Lomé Convention or in the framework of other agreements
with different regions, is increasingly centred upon priorities for food security.’
(European Commission, 1996).  Certainly, favourable policy changes to
encourage agricultural development within many developing countries, as well
as the steps taken to open agricultural markets in the Uruguay Round, create a
more positive environment for new agricultural aid projects compared to the
past.
While these create the potential for increased external assistance to
agriculture, reversing the declining trend in aid volumes will require active
political support in donor countries.  The views of development NGOs and22
agricultural interest groups are particularly important.  NGO are rightly
concerned that aid should be directed towards the most vulnerable communities
and households.  Much agricultural aid in the past, which went to promote
export agricultural crops, irrigation projects and large-scale land development,
failed to have a clear poverty focus.  Not surprisingly, NGO support went
instead to increasing aid flows to areas such as environmental protection and the
social sector.  One of the requirements for rebuilding support for increased
agricultural aid will be to re-think the strategy of agricultural development in
order to emphasise the links with poverty alleviation.  One of the refreshing
things about the World Bank Rural Development Action Plan is its explicit
recognition of this requirement.
The influence of agricultural interest groups in the formulation of aid
policy varies across countries and is more significant in the United States than in
Europe.  The United States is a major food exporter, and in periods of low world
market prices and rising food surpluses, farmers have lobbied hard against
extending aid to agricultural projects in developing countries which might
provide additional competition.  The extensive research on whether foreign aid
complements or conflicts with the interests of US producers shows decisively
that even farmers in the industrialised countries gain from faster agricultural
growth in developing countries (as an example, see Rosegrant et al., 1995).  This
is a message which needs to be communicated again and again.
The prospects for a reversal of the decline in food aid are less marked.
Food aid programmes will probably continue for the rest of this decade at the
lower levels seen in recent years.  Despite the evidence that the LIFDCs could
absorb double the food aid volumes provided even in the peak year of 1993, the
political coalitions which sustained food aid in the past have begun to dissipate
and fragment. De-linking of food aid from agricultural  policy may improve its23
quality, but also reduces political support for higher volumes.  Food aid is now
more competitive with financial aid and donors see few reasons why a higher
proportion of shrinking financial aid budgets should be diverted to food aid. The
pledge in the Decision attached to the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture to
review the level of food aid established under the Food Aid Convention ‘to
establish a level of food aid commitments sufficient to meet the legitimate needs
of developing countries during the reform programme’ will probably mean no
further reduction in these commitments over the lifetime of the Agreement.
These minimum commitments under the Food Aid Convention set a floor which
guarantees the continuation of food aid programmes at more or less the current
level, but there seems little reason for donors to exceed these levels in future.
The food security implications of this drop in food aid need to be carefully
evaluated.  Aid for emergencies will continue to have first call on food aid
budgets.  More careful targeting of food aid on the most needy countries is
essential, but with 80 per cent of deliveries now going to to LIFDCs, there is
little excess to be squeezed in this area. Project food aid is also likely to be
protected because of the institutionalisation of WFP and NGO programmes
which make effective use of this kind of aid.  The main brunt of the reduction in
food aid will fall on programme aid where the food security implications are
more indirect and depend on the developmental use of the counterpart funds.
Assuming these trends continue, then the nutritional impact of declining food aid
budgets will be limited.  It implies, however, an even greater responsibility to
ensure that adequate financial aid is made available to overcome the barriers to
access to food among poor and vulnerable households.  The one event which
might alter this prognosis would be a series of food emergencies leading to a
massive growth in refugees and displaced persons.24
Table 1.  Official commitments of external resources to agriculture (broad definition,
millions constant 1990 US dollars).
1980-82 1983-86 1987-89 1990-92 1993-95
Total 17,168 16,433 16,845 13,299 10,038
  Bilateral 6,415 6,020 7,510 5,394 4,035
  Multilateral 11,283 10,413 9,335 7,905 6,002
Share bilateral % 37% 37% 45% 40% 40%
Sources:  1980-1990 data at constant 1985 prices from Von Braun et al., 1993;  1991-1995 data at 1990 prices
from Statistical Analysis Service, FAO;  1985 prices converted to 1990 prices using the Export Manufactures
Unit Value index from UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade Statistics, 1993.
Table 2.  External assistance to agriculture committed by the DAC countries
Region 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
(US$ million)
EU 1,599 2,127 1,609 1,419 1,512
Japan 1,354 2,101 1,562 1,500 2,218
US 632 442 363 460 378
Other 381 325 248 299 218
Total 3,967 4,995 3,781 3,679 4,327
(per cent shares)
EU 40.3% 42.6% 42.5% 38.6% 35.0%
Japan 34.1% 42.1% 41.3% 40.8% 51.3%
US 15.9% 8.8% 9.6% 12.5% 8.7%
Other 9.6% 6.5% 6.6% 8.1% 5.0%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: FAO Statistical Analysis Service, 1997
Table 3.  Percentage of bilateral aid committed to production agriculture, 1985-95
Region 1985-1989 1990-1992 1993-1995
% % %
EU 13.2 8.6 8.0
Japan 11.9 11.7 9.1
US 10.2 2.7 5.4
Others 14.8 9.5 7.6
Total DAC 12.0 7.3 7.5
Source:  OECD, Development Co-operation, various.  Figures for the EU and Others are unweighted
averages.  Spain and Portugal only included in the EU total since 1991.  Others include Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.25
Table 4.  Sectoral distribution of the lending of the Multilateral Development Banks for
the years 1986, 1991 and 1996 (percentages)
Sector IBRD/IDA IDB/FSO AsDB/AsDF AfDB/AfDF
1986 1991 1996 1986 1991 1996 1986 1991 1996 1986 1991 1996
Agriculture 29 16 12 21 11 8 41 21 15 37 24 13
Other
productive
45 40 37 48 35 17 41 66 57 53 58 55
Social 11 22 27 21 11 30 14 13 13 10 3 4
Other 16 23 26 10 44 46 5 0 16 0 14 29
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source:  OECD 1998, based on data compiled by the North-South Institute of Canada from the multilateral
development banks’ Annual Reports.
Table 5.  EU multilateral aid by selected purposes, 1986-1995
Sector 1986-1989 1990-1992 1993-1995
Food aid 18.7 18.9 10.1
Humanitarian aid 2.9 7.4 11.9
Agriculture 9.6 7.9 5.5
Rural development 8.8 2.4 0.9
Source:  Cox and Koning, 1997
Table 6. Distribution of bilateral aid commitments by major purpose, per cent




22.1 24.6 23.3 20.2 26.2 29.0
Economic
infrastructure
21.3 19.5 17.0 17.5 20.4 22.7
Agriculture 12.1 12.0 8.6 7.2 7.5 7.4
Industry and other
production
15.1 7.8 5.8 6.3 3.9 3.1
Food aid 6.9 5.5 3.6 3.3 3.2 1.2
Programme assistance 13.5 16.4 11.9 11.6 7.5 5.8
Other (inc debt relief) 11.0 14.4 29.7 34.2 31.5 30.7
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source:  OECD, Development Co-operation Annual Reports, Paris.  The classification used in the first
column may not be exactly similar to that used from 1987-88 onwards.26
Table 7.  Global food aid deliveries, 1988-96
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total food aid 14848.3 11733.6 13641.8 13195.9 15219.0 16846.1 12644.8 9845.8 7488.2
Low-income, food
deficit countries 12812.2 9455.1 10083.2 11064.7 12148.6 10443.3 9868.3 7571.9 5823.6
Proportion of cereal
imports of LIFDCs
covered by food aid (%) 15 14 17 16 16 12 11 9 6
Source:  WFP (Interfais);  FAO, Food Aid in Figures and Food Outlook for last row
Table 8.  Global food aid deliveries by category for 1988-94
Years Total Programme Relief Project
(million tonnes)
1988-90 13408.0 7340.5 2812.2 3255.3
1991-92 14202.0 7156.3 4265.4 2780.3
1993-94 14880.5 7223.4 4403.3 2753.9
(per cent)
1988-90 100% 55% 21% 24%
1991-92 100% 50% 30% 20%
1993-94 100% 49% 30% 19%
Source:  WFP (Interfais)
Table 9.  Total food aid by region
1988-1990 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96
(million tonnes)
Sub-Saharan Africa 3558.6 5008.1 4560.9 2862.9
N.Africa/M.East 2814.3 2340.5 1011.6 740.6
South/East Asia 3770.4 2895.1 2283.0 2144.0
L. America/Caribbean 2306.2 1929.8 1710.1 838.5
Europe and CIS 958.5 2034.0 5180.0 2081.2
Total 13407.9 14207.5 14745.5 8667.0
(per cent)
Sub-Saharan Africa 27% 35% 31% 33%
N.Africa/M.East 21% 16% 7% 9%
South/East Asia 28% 20% 15% 25%
L. America/Caribbean 17% 14% 12% 10%
Europe and CIS 7% 14% 35% 24%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source:  WFP (Interfais)27
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